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I N T R O D U C T I O N

INTRODUCTION
A united Germany, prior to the emergence of Otto von
Bismarck as the driving force in the upper echelons of
Prussian politics, was a mere dream.

Under the stern and

often questionable leadership of Bismarck, this dream of
German unification was realized and Germany, led by Prussia,
became the dominant power in Europe.

The movement towards

the unification of Germany was initiated by Napoleon
Bonaparte when, in 1806, the south-western provinces of
Germany were organized into the Confederation of the Rhine.
With the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine, the
Holy Roman Empire was formally dissolved and Francis II,
Hapsburg ruler of Austria, was compelled to surrender the
title of emperor.
Following Napoleon's defeat, another step on the path
towards a united Germany was taken by the Congress of Vienna
in 1815.

As a result of the decisions reached by the dele

gates at the Congress of Vienna, Germany was organized into a
loosely united group of nearly independent states.

This

German �onfederation or Bund coincided with the desires of
Austrin and did not meet the demand� and aspiration0 of the
increasi.np; number of Germans who wanted , un LI i 0d (, ,rmnn
f;tn L
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clear during the Congress of Vienna that she wanted the
creation of a strong union in Germany in which the central
government should be quite powerful.
Between 1819 and 1844, the organization of the
Zollverein (Customs Union) had created economic unity in
Germany--particularly in the areas of Germany where Prussian
influence was dominant.

The Zollverein formed a close

economic union of the great majority of the states in the
German Confederation and resulted in the establishment of
a moneyed middle-class.

As industry developed under the

Zollverein's enlightened policies, the rising middle-class
was converted to German unity more by the solid benefits of
business prosperity than by speeches of patriotic oratorso
All of the foregoing had, in some small way, paved the
way for the eventual unification of Germany in the nineteenth
century.

Nevertheless, it was the arrival of Otto von

Bismarck on the Prussian political scen8 that made a united
Germany a reality.
William I, upon succeeding to the throne of Prussia in

1861, encountered considerable difficulty with parliament
regarding his proposed army reforms�

The diet was opposed to

voting new credits for army reform, and William I was unable
to get the necessary funds because of the deadlock that
existed between the lower and upper houses.

There was no

constitutional provision to remedy a deadlock b}tween Lhe
two \1011�;0:;.

Tl1nl'l:f'or , witl1 Cic:rn:r,11
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summoned by the king.

William I asked Bismarck if he would

be willing, with neither a majority in parliament nor even
a budget, to carry on the fight for military reorganization
against the Landtag.1 Upon receiving an affirmative reply

. .

to continue the
2
battle together with you, and I shall not abdicate."
from Bismarck, William I resolved, "•

After being appointed minister, Bismarck lost little
time in announcing his policy for making Prussia the dominant
German power when, in a speech before the Prussian Parliament,
he said, "Not by speeches and majority resolutions are the
great questions of the time decided • • • but by iron and
blood."
The mood for Prussian foreign policy under Bismarck was
set within a few weeks after his taking office.

The Elector

of Hesse-Cassel had been making a general nuisance of himself
by proposing the elimination of the constitution and returning
to absolute rule.

Bismarck sent a blunt message informing

the Elector of Hesse-Cassel to'stop his anti-constitutional
activities.

From this relatively small beginning, Bismarck

expanded Prussian foreign policy until he created the
"Bismarckian German Empire.11 3
1Raymond Phineas Stearns, Pa eant of Euro e: Sources
g
p
and Selections from the Renaissance to the Present Da
-New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 947 , p.
2
F. Darmstaedter, Dismarck and the Cr.ntlon of the
Second Reich (London: J'.llcthuen & Co., Ltd., 191,rq, p. l.91...
3
Hu.lph Fl 'nLcy, L�0..�!.9.:!:}�_9,9rm.�}_r� IIL:�tory (N1•w Yt11·l·:
,
I•, • J) • l) ( 1 l, L () ll ;] il d (; pi1 ll y ' I 1 I(' • ' 0 � ) ) , Jl • , ' ], ' •
()Iii
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Politically, Bismarck was a genuine conservative who
believed that good government rested on force and fear and
that the best form of government was the "monarchical"--a
government in which the people would be governed for their
own good by the king and his ministers.

Regarding politics,

Bismarck said, "In politics no one does anything for his
.. n4
neighbor unless he finds it to his own interest.
0

Bismarck knew it was necessary for him to control Prussian
foreign policy if he was to attain his desired goal--the
unification of Germany under Prussian leadership.

He realized

his inability to make events happen that would benefit him;
however, he was a master at using the events of the era to
ultimately reach the goal he had set for Prussia.
In order for Bismarck to achieve his goal, it became

necessary for him to keep his schemes and plans secret from
everyone--including his monarch, whom he loved and to whom he
pledged his loyalty.

Bismarck realized he had to control the

king and, in so doing, resorted to any tactic to gain the
king's approval for his schemes and/or plans.

One of the

first instances of Bismarck's ability to influence King
William I occurred when Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria
proposed a meeting of the German princes in August 1863.

This mee�ing, to take place at Frankfurt, was for the purpose
of reorganizing the German Bund.

After a dramatic struggle,

6
Bismarck induced William I not to attend; therefore, any
plans formulated at the meeting would be still-born since the
major power of northern Germany was not represented.
Bismarck was a master politician and desired to maintain
control of events at all times.
suggested, a militarist.

He was not, as many have

Bismarck aspired to control events,

and war was, for him, a clumsy way of settling international
disputes.

He erected barriers against the demands of the

military for supremacy over political policy in wartime.
He insisted upon the supremacy of political over military
5 Bismarck felt that wars deprived him of control
strategy.
of the situation and left the decisions to generals--whose
ability he distrusted.

Bismarck was a civilian to the core,

and he always wanted to back a certain winner.

His friend,

Von Moltke, the greatest Prussian general, often reminded
Bismarck that "nothing was certain in war."

6

To bring about German unification, Bismarck adopted a
fundamentally simple plan.

Basically, his plan was to make

war on Austria and after defeating her, to exclude Austria
from the new German Confederatic,n w.hich would be formed with
Prussia being the dominant state and the King of Prussia the

real ruler.

(,

A.

,J.

( N n1 y (li . J, :
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Bismarck knew King William would not approve an
offensive war against Austria; therefore, Bismarck had to use
the events of the time to make it appear as though Prussia
was the injured party and was fighting for her national honor
against the hostile Austrians.

Bismarck also realized he had

to remain on good terms with all of the other ereat powers in
order to be free to carry his "defensive" war against Austria
to a satisfactory conclusion.

Bismarck set out to gain allies

for Prussia; or, at any rate, promises of non-intervention
from the great powers.

In January 1863, Prussia managed to obtain the friend

ship of Russia.

The Polish possessions of Russia rose in

revolt and Czar Alexander II was compelled to use strong
measures to suppress insurrectionists.

Other European powers,

notably France, England, and Austria, protested the manner in
which the czar was handling the Polish Insurrection and
threatened diplomatic intervention.

Bismarck offered to

support Czar Alexander thereby enabling the Russian govern
ment to ignore the protests of the other great powers.7
Bismarck needed some event to arise to allow him to
pursue his course of action insofar as having a war against

7 Alv�nsleben Convention--February 8, 1863:

Bismarck
sent Count Alvensleben to assure the czar of Prussia's full
cooperation against the rebels. Four Prussian corps .(half of
the army) were dispatched to the Polish frontier. This action
made it possible for Russia to resist the attempted int rv n
tion by Austria, Engl.and, and Franc on behalf or th
o. J.
It also won the czar's trust and friendsh p dur·1,>, t1w thr.
w· r ne n· ary .for th, fu. f ·J.lrn .nt of lli ...,mnt'ck' :, d1·1.:·1111--Lho
uni fi �uti.on r Cnrm:rny und ,1· 1'ru,;::\nn 1<nd1i1·::liip.

Austria.

Prussia must, of course, appear to be the injured

party; and the war would be necessary for Prussia to preserve
her national honor and her very existence against the hated
Austrians.

Then, in the famous Schleswig-Holstein affair of

1863, Bismarck saw his opportunity--an opportunity to acquire
new territory for Prussia, to exhibit the efficiency of the
Prussian army, and, most important, to eventually maneuver
Austria into a position of being an aggressor.

C H A P T E R
0 N E

T H E

F I R S T

W A R

O F

U N I F I C A T I O N

CHAPTER I
THE FIRST WAR OF UNIFICATION
Schleswig-Holstein:

Background

The two duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had been
bound to the King of Denmark in a form of personal union

since a fifteenth century proclamation stated that the two
duchies should remain undivided for ever and ever.

The

inhabitants within the two duchies were primarily of German
origin in the Duchy of Holstein; whereas, in Schleswig, they
were part Danish and part German in national origin.

Conflict

within the duchies and interest from outside powers had
brought the duchies into the limelight in the mid-1800's.
This conflict had been supposedly settled by the London
2
Protocol of 1852.
1Erich Eyck, Bismarck and the German Em ire (New York:
p
W. W. Norton and Company, Inco, 1958), p. 78.
2
The main line of the ruling dynasty was dying out, and
the succession to the Danish throne was certain to pass,
sooner or later, to the Glilcksburg branch of the family. But
this branch derived title through the female line, and,
according to the law as interpreted by the Schleswig
Holsteiners, the succession should pass to the younger
Augustenburg line instead of the Glilcksburg line. The con
ference in London undertook to change all of this. It was
decreed that Schleswig-Holstein should be permanently a oci
ated with Denmark; and that the succession, l oth ·.n D run· r
and the duchies, should be vc0t d .in th, lUcki,lmr .., \, . r:J.
'l'hi Lrcaty, knowu as th "Lorn.l n Pr t C)I or ll�'J�', 0 \:\�;
•'i{';necl (n May<�, 11��?. by Pru,:_;�;La 11d i\\1!.L1·iH .t�: l•.m·o,tim1
l ll

11

The international conference in London in 1852 had
asserted the integrity of the Danish monarchy with due
recognition of the special rights of the duchies, and had
also decided the question of succession to the throne of
Denmark.

In 1852, Bismarck served as mediator in negotiating

an agreement wherein the House of Augustenburg renounced its
rights to the throne in return for monetary remuneration.3
Thus, the question of Schleswig-Holstein appeared to be
resolved.
In 1863 a new crisis arose that re-opened the dispute
concerning the Elbe Duchies.

In November 1863, Christian IX

succeeded to the throne as the rightful GlUcksburg heir in
accordance with the London Protocol.

Christian's predecessor,

Frederick VII, had drawn up a new constitution, but Frederick
had not signed the new constitution into law prior to his
death.

Therefore, it was left for Christian IX to act on this

new Danish constitution.

One of the provisions of the new

constitution as adopted by the Danish Reichsrat decreed "the
complete incorporation of Schleswig in Denmark.
This act was, of course, in violation of the London Protocol
of 1852 wherein the two provinces should never be made an
integral part of the Kingdom of Denmark.

powers; but it was not ratified by the German Confederation,
nor in any way accepted by the Schleswig-Holst ·ner .

3 narm taedter, op. cit., p. 230.

4 bld.
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Christian IX, almost immediately upon succeeding to the
t hrone, signed the new constitution into law.

This, of

course, was in violation of the provisions of the Protocol of

1e52.

Also, most of the German inhabitants refused to recog

nize Christian IX as their ruler as he had succeeded to the
Almost immediately support for

throne from the female line.

the Duke of Augustenburg arose throughout the duchies.

Now

the question of renunciation of Augustenburg's right to the
duchies which had been made in 1852 was re-opened.

The

supporters of Augustenburg argued that the head of the House
of Augustenburg had renounced his right to the duchies, but
this renunciation did not affect "the highly personal rights
of his son." 5

Bismarck could now go into action.

The upheaval over

the question of succession to the Danish throne opened the
door for political maneuvering by the Prussian minister.
Earlier, in the days when he talked of "blood and iron,"
Bismarck had said,
The Danish question can only be settled in
a way favourable to us through war; the occasion
for war is to be found at whatever moment our
situation in relation to the other6Great Powers
is most favourable for waging war.

From the outset, Bismarck kept "the annexation of the duchies
steadily before his eyes."
5

7

Ibid.
6
Ibid., p. 229.
7 ],' l n 1
y ' 0 • Ci. t • ' r • 21 L,.•
J

- ----
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From Enemies to "Allies"
Bismarck saw in the Schleswig-Holstein question an
opportunity to eventually bring about a war against Austria.
But, first of all, he would have to have Austria as Prussia's
"ally" to settle the Schleswig-Holstein affair.

He planned

for Austria and Prussia to unite and settle the Schleswig
Holstein problem without outside interference.

First of all

Bismarck had to develop arguments to keep both the great
powers and the members of the German Confeder ation from
interfering.

In presenting his case to the great powers, he

argued that the Schleswig-Holstein affair was primarily a
German question and should, therefore, be settled by the
German powers.

To the members of the German Confederation,

Bismarck stated the Schleswig-Holstein problem was an inter
national matter since the Danes had violated the London
Protocol of 1852--a document which the German Confederation
did not sign.

Even though his arguments were inconsistent,

Bismarck did manage to have his way and kept both the great
powers and the German Confederation from acting on the
Sch leswig-Holstein question.
Bismarck approached the Austrians concerning a joint
Austro-Pruss:Lan military operation against the duchies.
Bismarck had to keep the question out of the diet for he
realized that if Austria sided with the medium-sized states in
the diet, he could do nothing to prevent an noccupation" of
the duchies by the Confeder·:1. ti.on.

B · .:im rck kn w that · f . uch

nn "0c 'Upat:ion" clid occur ) t,h,n th,! di<:L wou) I

clti

i l,' Uw
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question of ownership of the duchies.

If the question of

ownership of the duchies was decided by the diet, then Prussia
would be stopped from annexing the duchies, which is what
Bismarck intended to do.
Bismarck proposed the Austro-Prussian alliance
purportedly to return the duchies to the status quo of 1852;
however, from the outset, Bismarck felt that it would be
impossible to return the duchies to their status of 1852.

8

Austria's minister, Rechberg, finally decided to accept
Prussia's invitation to join in a united effort to liberate
the duchies.

Thus, Bismarck's first great triumph in foreign

policy was his success in aligning Prussia and Austria in a
combined effort to free the Elbe Duchies from Denmark.
By consummating this alliance, Bismarck was now assured the
diet of the German Confederation would not, in fact, could
not, act on the question of the duchies.

Now, he had to

plan to insure the non-interference of the great powers.
Prussia had gained the friendship of Russia by Bismarck's
pledge of Prussian support for Russia during the Polish
Insurrection.

Bismarck did not fear England as she had no

army to speak of and England and France were not on the best
of terms; therefore, an alliance between these two nations to
halt Austria and Prussia seemed unlikely.

15
In France, the ideological basis of Napoleon Ill's

9
whole policy was the "principle of nationality."

The London

Protocol of 1852 which subjected a population of German origin
to the rule of the Danes was not compatible with Napoleon's
policy.

Therefore, Bismarck saw no problems forthcoming .from

the French government.

Also, Napoleon's idea was to divide

the duchies according to the nationalities of their inhabi
tants:

the Danish population of northern Schleswig thus

should go to Denmark, the remainder to Germany.

Bismarck led

Napoleon to believe that he would be willing to leave northern
10
Schleswig to Denmark.
Thus, Bismarck felt secure in not having to fight any of
the great powers; also, he had induced Austria to join Prussia
to put an end to the anarchy and folly in the duchies.

Now,

he was free to act in the Elbe Duchies with the assistance of
his strong southern neighbor, Austria.

Bismarck knew well

that eventually "the fate of the duchies would . • • be
11

determined by Austria and Prussia."

Bismarck also knew

that he would be able to use the Schleswig-Holstein question
12
to bring about a final "settling of accounts" with Austria.

9Eyak, _o_p_._c_it_., p. 85.
lOibid.

l')(i\ L
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The Seizure of Schleswig-Holstein
Prussia and Austria marched side by side into the
duchies, conquered the Danes, and occupied the whole of
Schleswig-Holstein; but not without a fearful struggle.
On January 16, 1864, the two powers dispatched an ultimatum
to Copenhagen demanding the repeal of the new constitution
signed by King Christian IX the previous November.

It was a

clever stroke of diplomacy, as this constitution was not
covered by the London Protocol.
vain.

The Danes looked for help in

On February 1, 1864, Prussia and Austria moved their

troops across the frontier of Holstein into the territory
where the Saxons and Hanoverians had been operating in
a ccordance with the "Execution" ordered by the diet of the
German Confederation since December 23, 1863.
Initially, Denmark fought the invading forces because
she felt she would receive some assistance from England and
other nations.

Bismarck himself encouraged the Danes to feel

tha t outside help would be forthcoming.

Bismarck realized

that if the Danes did not resist, he would have considerable
difficulty in supporting his planned annexation of the duchies.
A few years later, Bismarck said, "· • • in making sure that
the Danes should not give way.

I managed to make them think

that England would support them • • • I knew that this was not
the case.u

1 ·1

n·
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By means of notes of protest, England did try to inter
vene; however, Bismarck resented English interference, and,
at one time, intimated that England's protests were not
worded strongly enough; also, he informed England that she
should support her protests by blockading the coasts of
Germany.

Bismarck never wavered one instance in the prosecu

tion of his policies against Denmark because he was sure that
England was unable to back up her threats with forceful
1
action. 4
The signatories of the Treaty of London allowed Prussia
and Austria to overrun the duchies.

After the victory at

Dilppel, with the Austro-Prussian forces on the doorstep of
Denmark, the signers of the Treaty 9f London (namely England)
protested, and an armistice was concluded.
conference met in London on April 25, lS64.

An international
The climax of the

conference came when the other powers compelled Austria and
Prussia to declare their war aims in a clear and unmistakable
manner.

To this meeting on the 2Sth of May the Austrian

delegate read, in the name of Austria and Prussia, a declara
tion demanding the complete separation of Schleswig and
Holst ein from Denmark and their union in a single state under
the sovereignty of the Prince of Augustenburg.
Den�ark then overplayed her hand.

Still confident she

would receive support from the great powers, she refused to

18
restore autonomy to the duchies.

Thus, the Danes had

repudiated the Treaty of London of 1852 thereby enabling
Austria and Prussia to repudiate it too, and hostilities were
renewed on June 27, 1864.
Finally the Danes, realizing the futility of their
struggle, signed the Treaty of Vienna of 1864.

According to

the terms of this treaty, Denmark turned the control of the
Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg over to the
joint administration of Austria and Prussia.

Suddenly, the

sweet reasonableness that had caused Austria and Prussia to
become allies disappeared.

Austria became wary of Prussia's

plans--Bismarck became surly.

Whatever either suggested,

the other opposed.
Review of the Danish War
Bismarck led his country to war against Denmark in
January 1864.

This action was taken in collaboration with

Austria, and its ostensible purpose was not to detach the
duchies from Denmark, as the Germanic Confederation wished,
but rather to force the Danish government to recogn�ze the
validity of the London Treaty of 1852 which had governed
Denmark's relations with Schleswig and Holstein in the past.
Privately, Bismarck believed from the beginning that a
return t; the status quo would prove impossible, and that the
control of the duchies would be given to Austria and Prussia.
It was also his hope that he would be abl
1c·ng to d mnnd t.iLl, to

U10
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by ri1�ht

t con

h

\W�;l,

anrl,

1

9

in the event Austria refused to agree to this, to carry his
point by military means.
All of Bismarck's calculations were accurate, and all of
his hopes fulfilled.

The divisions among the great powers

and the stubbornness of the Danes combined to make impossible
a return to the status quo in the duchies; and, when Danish
resistance was finally beaten down, Schleswig and Holstein
passed into Austro-Prussian control.

Almost immediately

differences arose between the two partners concerning the
ultimate disposal of the conquered territory.

While Austrian

irritation mounted, the Prussian minister was able to convince
his sovereign--although the process took some time--that his
confidence in Austria had been misplaced and that his nally"
was, in reality, seeking to defeat Prussia's legitimate
aspirations.
Through Bismarck's policy, the Danish War had been
brought to a final and, for Germany, happy conclusion.
Bismarck said many times that he felt the diplomatic struggles
of 1864 "as the most difficult and the most successful of
15

his life."

Throughout this period, Bismarck constantly

reminded King William of his duty ttto extend the borders of
Prussia as his ancestors had done."

Thus, Bismarck's problems

were inc..reased by his desire to obtain for Prussia "territory
to which she had no claim." 16

15 Erne

st F. Henderson, A Short History
Vol. II:
1648 A.D. to 19 4 A.D. (New York:
Company, l�l7), p. �9).
16
Fl nley,
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CHAPTER II
THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR
Disagreements Arise Among the Conquerors
With the handing over of the Elbe Duchies to Prussia and
Austria in 1864, the Schleswig-Holstein question was far from

settled.

The dispute as to what was to become of the spoils

of the Danish War occupied the cabinets in Berlin and Vienna
and soon brought about renewed tensions in the relations
between Austria and Prussia.

There is no doubt that both the

Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia honestly wanted
peace and mutual understanding, but Bismarck's mind was set
on the outright annexation of Schleswig-Holstein and also on
a showdown with Austria.

Bismarck now let his intentions become more clear.

While

the war was in progress, he had indicated to Austria that
Prussia was interested in annexing the duchies.

He had to

deal with som_e opposition from King William, who felt he had

no right to the duchies and that Augustenburg had; but in the
course 0£ time Bismarck was able, as always, to bring his
monarch around to his way of thinking.
Austr ia proposed that the Prince of Augustenburg should

be installed as Duke of Schleswig-Holste·n:
hl
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unanimously supported him; and even King William thought well
of the Augustenburger.

Outside the two powers immediately

concerned, the same sentiment prevailed--England, France, and
Russia looking on the Augustenburger as the true prince.
Against all of these stood Bismarck.
not to place another

11

Bismarck was determined

puppet n of Austria in the German

Confederation.
Many arguments �ere presented as to the Augustenburger's
rights, but Bismarck trumped up other arguments against the
prince--most convincing being the one that old rights and
claims had been superseded by the recent victory over the
Danes.

The majority of the German states, acting through the

Federal Council at Frankfurt, tried to settle the matter;
however, Bismarck reminded them that the German Confederation
had no right to meddle since Prussia and Austria now held the
territory by right of conquest.

When the western powers,

France and Great Britain, tried to interfere, Bismarck informed
them that the matter was none of their business; the problem
was a German problem and would be settled by Germans.
Bismarck contended that Austria was too far distant from
the duchies to have any real practical interest in them.

He

also argued that Prussia, adjoining the duchies, had a direct
practical•interest--in the harbor at Kiel being necessary for
proper Prussian naval development; in the right to dig a

canal connecting Prussian dominions on the North Sea with
those on the Baltic; and in the ext n ion of th
r i)wny

ystcm northward.
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Therefore, Bismarck proposed that Austria surrender to

Prussia virtually all rights in the newly acquired territory.
Austria, after first refusing and then shuffling this offer,

expressed a willingness to consider Bismarck's plan; however,
Austria insisted on compensation.

The Austrians desired the

restoration of the Silesian territory taken from her a hundred
years before by Frederick the Great.

To this Bismarck would

not listen; he refused to yield an inch of Prussian territory,
and Frederick's conquests, he held especially sacred.

War

between the two powers seemed likely to come at any moment.
Bismarck was not only having trouble with Austria, but
was constantly having to manipulate his monarch.
pressed King William to claim the duchies.

Bismarck

The king said he

had no moral right to the duchies, but would agree to accept
them if they were offered to him--an event that was not likely
to occur.

Bismarck also reminded his king that it was "his

duty to extend the borders of Prussia as his ancestors had
done."

In February 1865, Prussia informed Austria of the condi

tions under which she would permit the duchies to be set up
as a separate German state.

The provisions were so severe

3
that they constituted annexation to Prussia in all but name.
The fram.ework of the arrangement involved a permanent alliance

1

Taylor, op. cit., p.

2 Flenley

78.

, loc. cit.
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with Prussia, naval bases, and the right to build a canal
across the peninsula.

Bismarck, in making the proposal, knew

its terms were so severe and extreme that Austria could not
possibly accept them.

The Prussian minister, in presenting

his case to King William, continued to point out Austria's
hostility and he was able to convince his monarch that the
Austrian's were trying to block Prussia's legitimate
desires in Schleswig-Holstein.
Upon hearing Bismarck's scheme, the Duke of Augustenburg
was obstinate; he had desires of becoming a truly independent
ruler.

The Austrians approved of Augustenburg's attitude.

One Austrian adviser commented he "would sooner plant potatoes

than be duke on the terms set forth by Bismarck." 4

Soon after Bismarck's proposal, Austria voted for a
federal resolution supporting Augustenburg.

This was a

"breach of the Austro-Prussian alliance in all but name." 5
Now, Bismarck had to begin earnest preparations for war

against Austria.

Bismarck received an-encouraging report

from the general staff concerning their appraisal of Austrian
strength and future policy was discussed by the Prussian
Crown Council on May 29, 1865.

William I would not claim the

duchies, and the king refused to grant Bismarck permission to
6
King William abhorred the French and
negotiate with France.

4Taylor, op. cit., p. 77.
5 Ibid.
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would never consent to an alliance with them; particularly an
alliance that might award Napoleon III some Prussian
territory as a gift for his assistance in war.

Bismarck had

to bluff Austria, and give the impression that he intended to
go to war with Austria for some reason or another.
Actually, Bismarck did not desire to go to war with
Austria because he was not certain Prussia could win such a
war without French assistance.

Bismarck had hoped Austria

would be forced to turn the duchies over to Prussia because
of difficulties brought on Austria by either France or
Russia.

Bismarck had hopes, in other words, that Austria

would become engaged in a war with either France or Russia,
and would be willing to give the duchies to Prussia in return
for Prussia's guarantee of neutrality.

However, after

examining the climate of the continent, Bismarck realized that
neither Russia nor France was in the mood to revolutionize
Europe.
As relations between the two German powers became more
and more strained, and the possibility of war against Austria
was discussed in Prussian ruling circles, Bismarck talked
threateningly and even proposed an alliance with Italy through
the Austrian post office.

However, he was not ready for the

breach tQ occur at this moment.

He presumably wanted to

said, "If war against Austria in alliance with France is
ruled out of the diplomatic vocabulary, no Prussian policy
is possible." William saw the trap. If Prussia claim d the
du chies, he would have to pay Bismarck's price nd ag
to
t th
alliance with Prance--a course that wns d toitab
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sound out opinion in the other capitals of Europe before
a final break in relations with Austria.
Agreement Through Mediation
The Italians were not induced to conclude an alliance
with Prussia as they did not feel Bismarck was ready to go to
war against Austria.

The Austrians, however, were upset;

they had no clear-cut plans for a war against Prussia.

The

lesser states of Germany were even more alarmed, and a
Bavarian, Count Blome, came forward as mediator.
From Prussia's point of view, the mediation was a success.

On August 14, 1865, the provisional Treaty of Gastein was
concluded.

This treaty divided the administration of the

duchies, whereas previously, the duchies had been administered
jointly under what was called a "condominium."
The Treaty of Gastein provided for Austria to take over
control of Holstein; Prussia to govern Schleswig; and Lauen
burg was sold outright to Prussia.

Moreover, Prussia gained

the right to establish a naval base at Kiel; also, to construct
a canal, two military roads and a telegraph line through

Holstein; and both duchies joined the German Customs Union. 7
The Gast�in Convention was received on all sides with an
outcry of indignation.

For the German people it was the

unpardonable violation of the principle to which not only
Germany, but Austria and Prussia had appealed from the very
7 s. H. Ste·nberg,
Tho M· cmillnn ,ompani,
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time that the Schleswig-Holstein question first arose:
namely, that the duchies should never be separated, but they
should remain as one forever.
The settlement reached at Gastein pleased King William.
He exchanged pledges of "loyal and honest understanding" with
For his part in having saved the
8
peace of Germany, Bismarck was made a "count" by William.

Emperor Francis Joseph.

The Treaty of Gastein, brought about by Austria's internal
problems and William's sincere desire for peace, proved but a
momentary obstacle in the war-like current.

Bismarck, himself,

commented on the treaty as "stopping up the cracks in the

building.11

9

Napoleon and Biarritz
The ink on the Gastein Treaty had hardly had time to dry
before Bismarck was on his way to Biarritz to see Napoleon.
Bismarck had tried directly to enact an alliance with Italy
and had failed.

Now, the Prussian minister decided to try to

negotiate an Italian alliance through Napoleon III, who had a
great deal of influence in Italy and who wanted to see Italy
acquire Venetia.

Initially, the Biarritz meeting with

Napoleon in October 1865 had been intended to drive the French
into action in Venetia, thereby enabling Prussia to acquire
the Elbe buchies from Austria in return for a pledge of
neutrality.
[�

'T' y lo r ,

Napoleon desired the opposite--he wanted a war
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between Austria and Prussia so that he might acquire Venetia
peaceably for Italy.

Napoleon did not oppose Bismarck's

plan for an alliance with Italy; mainly, because he felt that
in an Austro-Prussian war, the combatants would be so evenly
matched as to promote� long drawn-out conflict enabling
France to eventually intervene and realize some gains without
having to actively engage in a war.

Napoleon spoke of the

quarrel between Austria and Prussia as providential--TTa stroke
.
Tl
seems sh ou1 d never arise.
of 1 uck wh ic
. h it
.

10

At Biarritz, both men talked vaguely of their future
plans and neither succeeded in tying the other down.

It has

often been said that Bismarck cheated Napoleon regarding
their discussions at Biarritz.

�any historians feel that

Bismarck promised, or hinted at, territorial concession�
along the Rhine for the assurance of French neutrality.
There is grave doubt that such discussions actually took
place.

First of all, Bismarck knew that King William would

not agree to cede any German lands to the hated French.

Also,

there was speculation that Napoleon was not actually inter
ested in the lands of the Rhine; that he was obsessed with
liberating Venetia and thereby, he supposed, distracting
Italy from Rome.

Neither Napoleon nor Bismarck committed himself to war

during the Biarritz talks.
negative bargain:

Actually, the two men struck a

Napoleon agreed not to ally with Austria

and to let Prussia have her war with Austria if she so
]_Q 'r;1y . 1.or, o
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desired to engage in such a conflict.

Bismarck, in return,

promised not to give Venetia to Austria in exchange for the
Elbe Duchies.
The real importance of the Biarritz talks from Bismarck's
point of view was that he finally realized that France was
not the least interested in a war.

Prior to these talks,

Napoleon's assistance in a war against Austria had always
been thought necessary by Bismarck; however, after the
Biarritz meeting, Bismarck realized that Prussia must defeat
Austria without French assistance.

Bismarck still had hope

of being able to get his way peacefully and would have been
ecstatic if a Franco-Italian alliance had attacked Venetia,
thereby forcing Austria to cede the duchies to Prussia in
11
order to be free to meet the aggressors from the south.
Alliance:

Italy and Prussia

Upon his return from Biarritz, Bismarck told the
Austrian ambassador, "Either a genuine alliance or war to
12
the knife."
The Austrians, unfavorably inclined toward
the alliance and fearful of the war, set about stirring up
The Austrians entered into this

support for Augustenburg.

action without any idea that war must eventually come.
Bismarck now set about to make Austria appear to be an
"impossible ally" in the eyes of King William.
began to annoy Austria in every possible way.
11

Taylor, 2...2..�-c�_}.t.,
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Bismarck
The Prussian

JO
minister persuaded General von Manteuffel, the Prus sian
Governor-General of Schleswig, to harrass the Austrian
Governor of Holstein, Gablenz, as much as possible.

Thus, a

few months after the provisional agreement at Gastein,

Bismarck was scheming to bring about a war with Austria;

however, he was going to provoke Austria into initiating the

con fl.J.ct. 13

Napoleon finally gave the Italians the necessary incen

tive to form an alliance with Prussia.

Napoleon informed

the Italians that an alliance between Prussia and Italy

would tend to make the balance of power in Germany more even

and would open the way for Italy's eventual acquisition of
Venetia.

Bismarck now began stirring up the Italians in

Austria's rear in addition to putting pressure on Austria

on the diplomatic front as well as in the duchies.

The eventual alliance between Prussia and Italy was
very favorable towards Prussia.

Basically, Italy agreed to

help Prussia in the event of an Austro-Prussian war; however,
Prussia made no promise that such a war would actually occur.

Also, Prussia's only concession to Italy was an agreement to

contin ue the war until Italy acquired Venetia--no longer.
One of t he most remarkable facets of this treaty was the

clause t�at stipulated the war, if there was to be one, would
have to begin within three months of the date of the signin g
14
of the �lliance (April 8, 1866).
l
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The Final Break
Bismarck now had to make Austria appear as the aggressor;
and to raise a question that would justify the forthcoming
He would not send his country into so great a

great war.

conflict on such an insignificant dispute as control over the
duchies.

In order to have a justifiable reason for such a

great war, Bismarck opened the German question and proposed a
German parliament elected by universal suffrage.

Thus, if

war was to come, posterity should not say that the cause was
over some trivial matter involving the ownership of a province;
rather, it was to be a fight for the holiest privileges of
15
man--for nationality, for free government.
Bismarck made his proposal of a parliament elected by
universal suffrage one day after having concluded the alliance
with Italy.

Bismarck's proposal miscarried as few Germans

considered him a radical and public opinion was against him.
The proposal of Bismarck had been prompted by Austria's
threat to submit to the Federal Diet a plan for federal
"execution" against Prussia.

Prussia had protested attempts

to undermine the provisional government in the duchies by
continued support for the Augustenburg pretender by the
inhabitants of the duchies--primarily in Holstein.

Austria,

being in control of Holstein did not feel Prussia had any

right to interfere in the internal problems of Holstein and
inquired if Prussia still considered the Treaty of Ga tein

it., p.
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as binding; then, Austria informed the courts of Germany
should Prussia's reply prove unsatisfactory, Austria would
propose the mobilization of the federal army by introducing
16
such a measure in the diet.
In May, Bismarck offered Austria a peaceful settlement
for the last time.

The terms were the same:

Prussia to

control Germany north of the Main; Austria to control the area
south of the Main.

Austria wanted Prussia to guarantee

Prussia could no longer do this--her alliance with

Venetia.

Italy guaranteed Venetia to the Italians; also, Bismarck had
promised Napoleon at Biarritz that Prussia would not give
Venetia to Austria.

Austria offered Venetia to Italy in

return for Italy's neutrality; however, the Italians were now
bound to the Prussians and could not give their pledge of
neutrality.

A European congress proposed by Napoleon failed

to meet because Austria insisted territorial changes could
not be discussed; therefore, Venetia would not be surrendered.
Inept Austrian statesmanship finally played into
It became too late to do anything but

Bismarck's hands.
fight.

Unable to negotiate and unwilling to accept Prussia

as their equal, the military heirarchy refused to let the
general European congress proposed by Napoleon settle their
dispute _with Prussia; also, they rejected the suggestion that
Prussia and Austria combine their armies and "dictate the law

1
to Europe. n 7
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On June 12, 1866, Napoleon reneged on his promise to
Bismarck and made a secret treaty with Austria wherein
Austria agreed to cede Venetia to Italy regardless of the
outcome of future events.

France was to receive some

indemnity in Germany; the precise nature of which would be
determined at a later date.

Thus, for French neutrality,

Austria was willing to give up western German lands and to
demote Prussia to a secondary power similar to its position
18
prior to the advent of Frederick the Great.
The final break occurred in June 1866 when Austria,
enraged by what she considered breaches of the Gastein agree
ment by Prussia, carried out her previous threat and brought
the matter before the Federal Diet and asked for a federal
decision on the future of the duchies.

This was, of course,

interpreted by Bismarck to be a formal repudiation of the
alliance providing the fate of the two duchies would be
settled by the two "allies" among themselves.

Bismarck had

won the waiting game--Austria had made the first openly
hostile move.
The Austrian action in the diet precipitated the
invasion of Austrian-held Holstein by Prussian forces.
Bismarck's plan was to have the Austro-Prussian troops clash
in the �uchies, thus giving the image of fighting for the
right of nationality and self-preservation; however, the
Prussian commander in Schleswig, Manteuffel, allowed the

34
Austrian governor, Gablenz, to remove the Austrian troops
from Holstein without a shot being fired.
Austria was determined, however, to provide Bismarck
with his war, and pushed forward their proposal in the diet
by calling for the mobilization of troops of the member
states of the Confederation--except for Prussia.

Had the

medium-sized states voted for this Austrian proposal, they
would have taken a clear stand against Prussia, and this
they wanted to avoid.

Therefore, the Bavarian minister

proposed that neither the Prussian nor the Austrian troops
be mobilized--thereby preserving impartiality.

Bismarck had

instructed his delegate that if either of these proposals
was passed, the Prussian representative was to state the
passing of the measure constituted a breach of the constitu
tion; therefore, Prussia no longer considered the Confedera
tion to be in existence.

On June 14, 1866, the fateful vote took place, and the

Bavarian motion--not the Austrian motion--was passed.
The Prussian plenipotentiary immediately rose and read the
declaration ordered by Bismarck.

It was apparent the

Prussian statement was a declaration of war.

Every member

stat e of the Confederation which had voted--not against
Prussia, but for the Bavarian motion--was in danger of being
19
.
attacked by Prussian armies.
Bismarck had attained his goal.

He had cajoled Austria

into ho0Lile a ction, and Prussia would enter th
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war from a defensive standpoint.

The Austrians had set the

stage for the war within the three-month limitation of the

alliance between Prussia and Italy; thus, Austria would have
to be fighting on two fronts.
was made.

No formal declaration of war

Prussian armies simply advanced to the Austrian

frontier and a message was sent to the nearest Austrian
officer declaring that a state of war existed.
War:

Austria vs. Prussia
The story of the Austro-Prussian War, or, as it is more

commonly known, the Seven Weeks War, is a simple one; and,
due to its simplicity and rapid conclusion, upset the calcu
lations of those (notably Napo�eon III) who thought it would
be a long and exhausting struggle.

Prussia was able to bring

pressure on Austria and her allies on three fronts.

The

strategy of the war, which had been plotted by Von Moltke,
called for lightning speed aided by perfect teamwork.
Von Moltke's plans had prevented the union of the armed
forces of the minor states with Austria.

The Prussian troops

were able to overwhelm and cut-off the minor states prevent
ing them from linking up with the main Austrian forces.
The decisive battle of the war was fought in Bohemia, at
20
Bismarck, Von Roon, Von Moltke,
Koniggratz, on July 3, 1866.
and King William had left Berlin four days earlier and were on
hand at Koniggratz to see the results of their planning and
the realization of their dreams.
'O
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Benedek, had tried to extricate his troops from the

threatened encirclement at K6niggr�tz, but Emperor Francis

Joseph ordered him to remain in his positions and meet the

The result was an over-whelming victory for the
21
Prussian f orces.
Prussians.

The battle at Koniggratz was one of the decisive turning

points of modern history.

Prussian hegemony in Germany was a

reality and the balance of power was now shifted well to the
The Prussian military establishment had carried the

east.

day because of its courage and discipline; also, due to the
superiority of the Prussian generals and a new development
in weaponry--the breech-loading "needle-gun." 22

The great Prussian victory at K�niggratz made a tremen

dous impression throughout the whole of Europe.

The balance

of power had been altered radically and a new era was about

to begin.

All of the European powers felt this change, and

no country more than France.

undesirable position.

Napoleon was suddenly in a most

Unable to come to a resolute decision,

he had negotiated with both of the adversaries.

He

had

assisted Prussia in obtaining the Italian alliance in April;

and in June, France had concluded a secret treaty with
Austria.

Napoleon had anticipated a long war- -a war of

attritiop; wherein France would be able to intervene and

secure some reward--perhaps something for France from both of
21S tein
. b erg, loc. cit.
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the antagonists.

The events had moved too fast and the sick
2
French ruler was not prepared to act. 3
After Koniggratz, the Austrians were convinced of their

inability to cope with Prussia and Italy simultaneously and
they requested Napoleon's assistance in negotiating a settle
ment with Italy.

Austria wanted to free her troops in the

south and move them to the Prussian battle lines.
Napoleon was not receptive to Austria's request.

Initially,
If he

agreed to assist Austria in negotiating a settlement with
Italy, then he would openly go back on his promise to
Bismarck made at Biarritz.

Napoleon desired to stay in the

background and not appear actively as an ally of Austria.
Instead of trying to negotiate an agreement between
Austria and Italy, Napoleon announced he would serve as
mediator and peacemaker to bring the Austro-Prussian conflict
to a conclusion.

This gesture was treated with scorn by

Bismarck and served to enrage King William.

Bismarck noted

that Napoleon was violating his pledge of neutrality.
King William felt he was going to be deprived of his rightful
24
hour of glory.
Bismarck now discussed the possibility of a war with

France while still engaging Austria.

After conferring with

Von Molt]ce regarding the feasibility of a two-front war,
Bismarck recognized that Prussia might be able to wage a
successful war against France and Austria at the same time,
2J'
1yck, o • cit., p. 128.
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but the Prussian minister's primary concern at the present
time was to prevent any serious damage to his plans as a
2
result of Napoleon's interference. 5 Bismarck exclaimed,

"I will be revenged on the Gauls when opportunity offers." 26

Bismarck now had to delay the start of negotiations as long
as possible to enable the Prussian troops to draw as close to
Vienna as they desired.

On July 5th, Bismarck sent the

following telegram to Napoleon:
I accept the proposal made by your Majesty and
am ready to come to an understanding with you about
the means to re-establish peace. I shall tell your
Majesty the conditions under which the military
Italy
situation and my obligations to the King
would allow me to conclude an armistice. 2

9r

Bismarck's instinctive statesmanship and his genius at
solving seemingly insurmountable problems were probably never
more significant than in the period immediately prior to the
preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg.

King William, flushed with

victory and continued military successes, desired to annex
territory in order to punish "all of his wicked opponents."

28

The king also desired to enter Vienna at the head of his
victorious army.

Emperor Napoleon III of France was becoming

impatient; however, physical illness prevented him from

29
interfering immediately.
25

Russia called for a congress;

Eyck, op. cit., p. 129.
26:
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however, Bismarck's threat to stir up the Poles caused the
Russians to withdraw in sulky silence.
It would appear as though Bismarck was the only person
who, at this time, saw the two dangers that must be avoided:
the virulen t hostility of Austria, and the immediate inter
cession of France.

Bismarck encountered bitter opposition

to his plan for a 'soft' peace for Austria.

On July 23rd,

under the presidency of the king, a council of war was held.
The purpose of this council was to decide whether Prussia
should make peace or continue the war.

Bismarck felt peace

had to be concluded, but he remained alone in his opinion.
Bismarck's account of this meeting is as follows:
After • • • K�niggratz • • • the first
advances of Austria with a view to peace negotia
tions was not only possible, but seemed demanded
by the interference of France • • • • I asked
General Von Moltke what he would do if France
actively intervened. His reply was, 'I should
adopt a defensive attitude towards Austria,
the Prussian ambassador in Paris, Count Goltz. Goltz held a
discourse before the Empress Eugtnie on the general state of
matters in Europe. He pointed out that the English government
was momentarily friendly toward Germany; that Russia still
remembered the support furnished by Napoleon to Poland; and
that Austria had never forgiven the emperor for aiding in
freeing Italy. He ended by asking if this were a time to
mortally wound King William's just pride of victory, or to
tamper with Italy. The ambassador's representations seemed
to have been effectual. Napoleon adopted a milder tone, and,
when the Prussian proposals finally arrived (Bismarck did
his best to delay the negotiations in order to give the
Prussian army time to draw closer to Vienna) and had been
formulated and laid before Napoleon by Goltz, Napoleon was
graciously pleased to approve them--adding for his own part
this one paragraph: "Austria's integrity, save as regards
Venice, shall be preserved.'' . This coincided well with
Bismarck's views, as he had said earlier (Battle of Ktrn· gg ratz)
to the king: 11 Th , quo c tJ.on at :i.t,'.nie i�� d , · dod; what n w
t stake i. to rer,,:i in the old friendsh · p wi.. th Au. ti i u. n Ih
knew /\u�1tr··.an i1:, ..., · f1LanetJ would bo neod d ./11.t:r.
.J
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confining myself to the line of the Elbe, and in
the meantime prosecuting the war actively against
France.'
This opinion confirmed me still more in my
resolution to advise his majesty to make peace
on the basis of the territorial integrity of
Austria . • • • I believed that the war against
France . . . would not be easy . • • perhaps, we
should not be able victoriously to maintain our
defensive against Austria on the Elbe if we had
to carry on a war of invasion in France • . . •

.

. . .

.

.

. .

. . . . .

. . .

.

.

. . . .

. .

. .

We had to avoid wounding Austria too severely;
we had to avoid leaving behind in her any unnecessary
bitterness of feeling or desire for revenge; we
ought rather to reserve the possibility of becoming
friends again with our adversary of the moment, and,
• • • regard the Austrian state as a piece on the
European chessboard and the renewal of friendly
relations with her as a move open to us. If Austria
were severely injured, she would become the ally of
France and of every other opponent of ours • • • •

.

.

.

.

. . .

.

. .

. .

.

. .

.
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. .

• • • The king . • . insisted on the cessions
of territory from Austria • • • • I replied that we
were not there to sit in judgement, but to pursue
the German policy • • • • Our task was the estab
lishment or initiation of a German national unity JO
under the leadership of the King of Prussia . • • •
Bismarck managed, with the support of the crown prince,
to sway King William to adopt his policies regarding the
termination of the war.

This was perhaps Bismarck's most

tr ying time with the monarch he personally loved.
'

The

Prussian minister resorted to tears, the throwing of crocker y,

hyste rics, an offer to resign, and even contemplated jumping
from a fourth floor window during the stormy scenes h8 had
with King William at this time.
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Peace and Unification
With the signing of the preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg
on July 26, 1866, Bismarck had realized the elimination of
Austria from Germany's affairs.

The Prussian minister also

demonstrated the wisdom of moderation in victory.

He was

careful not to generate unnecessary hatred or vengeance in

the heart of the conquered. 3

1

The terms of the preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg (July 26,

1866) and the definitive Peace of Prague (August 23, 1866)

were basically the same as Goltz had presented to Napoleon. 32
The proposals submitted to Napoleon and adopted as a basis
for peace were:
a)

Austria was obliged to cede Venetia to Italy;

b)

Schleswig-Holstein should be incorporated with

Prussia-' 33
c)

Austria should recognize the dissolution of the old

German Confederation;
Austria s hould not oppose a reorganization of the

d)

German states north of the Main in a "closer union" with
Prussia;

31 Reinhardt, op. cit., p. 540.

32

Supra, footnote #29, p. 38.

33 Napoleon agreed on condition that a plebiscite be

held in northern Schleswig to determine whether that area
should go to Prussia or Denmark. Bismarck agreed to this;
however, the plebiscite was not held during his lifetime.
The main resiRta nce to the plebiscite came from the
mili tnri tic K · np; William who, from a f cl· nr, of f·1 l .,e pj ty,
did not WiJnt to give up tho hi:ltt·.lc:�fj lcfo or l 61, to LlH'
Dano.).
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e)

Austria and her allies should make good the costs-

or, as amended by Napoleon, a part of the costs--of the war;
f)

Prussia would not oppose a union of the German

states south of the Main, excluding Austria;
g)

Prussia would annex three to four million inhabi

tants of the German states north of the Main.

Napoleon

agreed to this declaring that the desired annexations were
details of the inner German organization.

He did desire,

however, that the Kingdom of Saxony should remain intact.
The Saxons had been the chief allies of the Austrians, and it
was a point of honor with the latter that the country should
not be dismembered.34
In granting these extremely lenient peace terms,
Bismarck sought to secure Austrian friendship--not their
bitterness.

Austria lost none of her Germanic lands, and

her only territorial loss was the province of Venetia to
Italy.

Bismarck humored the Austrian emperor's request

concerning the integrity of Saxony.

These lenient peace

terms were regarded by Bismarck as insurance for the future
35
in the event of a war with France.
Prussia made separate treaties with t.he south German
states of Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt.
BismarckJ desiring to secure the friendship of these smaller
states, extracted a small monetary remuneration while these
states lost very little territory.
Jl13r
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The states of 0outhern
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Germany signed military agreements whereby their armies would
be placed under the command of the King of Prussia in the
36
event of war.
In the north, Prussia rounded out her frontiers and
unified her territories.

Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse

Cassel, Nassau, and the free city of Frankfurt were all
annexed by Prussia.

Prussia now controlled two-fifths of the

land area and two-thirds of the population of Germany; and,
most important, Austria was excluded from Germany.

The states

of northern Germany, including Saxony, formed with Prussia

the North German Confederation (Norddeutscher Bund).

The settlement was a great victory for Bismarck's policy
of "blood and iron."

From parliament, Bismarck received his

reward from the body he had been defying for four years.

In a gesture of forgive and forget, the parliament passed an

indemnity bill which legalized all of his expenditures during
the past years.

The parliament also voted him a grant of

money for his personal use.

With this money, Bismarck

purchased the estate of Varzin in Pomerania.

Thus, Bismarck

had overcome his opponents by his very success.

He had,

at last, unified northern Germany under Prussian leadership.37

36
3

steinherg, o ). cit., p. 2'>u.
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CHAPTEH. III
THE NORTH G EHMAN CONF�DEH/\TION
The constitution formulated by Bismarck for the new
North German Confederation served as the constitution of the
German Empire after 1871.

This document remained in force

until the end of World War I in 1918.

Bismarck turned his

efforts to the preparation of this instrument after he had
had a period of illness and rest in 1866.

Upon presentation

to a Reichstag, which had been elected by universal suffrage
for this purpose, the constitution passed with a few changes
in about two months.

Under the terms of the constitution,

Prussia gained almost complete control of the new entity
known as the North German Confederation.1
The twenty-one states of northern Germany that had
joined the newly created North German Confederation had to
recognize Prussia as their self-chosen leader.

The King of

Prussia by hereditary right held the position of President
of the Confederation.

He exercised executive authority,

princip�lly concerned with foreign affairs and the military
establishment, but he had no legislative and no veto power.
The president of the Confederation appointed the federal
chancel]or, the only minister of the Conf der�t·o , who w·.
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responsible only to the president.

The chancellor could

name assistants, but Bismarck was careful to avoid anything
that resembled real cabinet government.

The chancellor was

to be the chairman of the upper house of the legislature,
the Bundesrat (Federal Council), wherein the delegates
represented the princes of the different member states-
actually, these delegates were ambassadors .

The states

received votes in the Bundesrat in proportion to the votes
they had had at the diet at Frankfurt, with the exception
that Prussia received in addition to her original ones, the
votes of the states she had annexed.

Thus, Prussia had

seventeen votes, but only fourteen were needed to veto a
constitutional amendment.
The Bundesrat met behind closed doors.

It had the sole

right of initiating legislation into the lower house or
Reichstag (Imperial Diet).

The Reichstag was elected in

proportion to the population by universal male suffrage.
This apparently democratic device was really a facade, for
the powers of the Reichstag were largely illusory.

It could

debate proposed legislation referred by the Bundesrat; and
more important, in spite of Bismarck's wishes, the Reichstag
had the right to pass on the annual budget.
The constitution had been tailored "by Bismarck for
Bismarck."

It worked well while he was in the position of

aut hority.

In the North German Confederation, Pru�sia had

conLrol of th,:: army and of forcip;n ;,1.ffai.r:3.
w ::- dominat1c!d by the l<inr,;

-----
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prestige as a member of the Hohenzollern dynasty and his
position of President of the Confederation.2
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1866 - 1870

YEAas OF UNSTABLE PEACE
Diplomatic Intrigues
Prussia's military victories and Bismarck's diplomatic
successes at home and abroad had been viewed with growing
apprehension in France.

Otto von Bismarck, President of the

Prussian Ministry and now Chancellor of the North German
Confederation, had won his great triumphs only because of his
long years of harmony with Napoleon III.

Napoleon and France

had remained neutral at the outset of the Seven Wee ks' War;
however, following Napoleon's intervention after Koniggratz,
he was indeed an "unfriendly neutral."

1

The years between 1866 and 1870 were filled with negotia

tions between Bismarck and Napoleon III.

The failure of these

negotiations to satisfy the French eventually brought on the
Franco-Prussian War in 1870.

This war was not made by Germany,

nor were the documents concerning its outbreak forged by
Germany.
True, Bismarck during these years was constantly on the
alert for any situation th&t would enable him to attain total
Germ3n unity--with or without France's approval.
'l'11yl r,
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times when the opposition of the states of southern Germany
appeared to be more of an obstacle to total German unifica
tion than Napoleon.

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 was

spawned in Paris by, in short, the ancient law of dictator
ships:

that is, they cannot maintain themselves when standing

still, or even when thriving, without new spectacles and new
This tended to provoke a war which
2
Pru3sia desired, but was quite willing to await.

proofs of t heir power.

No one was more chagrined by the abrupt termination of
the Seven Weeks' War of 1866 than Napoleon.

The French

ruler had hoped for a war of attrition--one in which he could
possibly intervene and extract compensations from both sides.
In the meeting between Bismarck and Napoleon at Biarritz,
there were supposedly broad hints of territorial compensa
tions in return for French neutrality during the Austro
Prussian War.

Following the Austrian defeat at Konigg ratz

and the preliminary Peace of Nikolsburg, Napoleon suggested
some compensations--namely, part of the left bank of the
Rhine, including the city of Mainz; and part of the
Palatinate, which belonged to Bavaria. 3
The demand by Napoleon of the territory belonging to
Bavaria enGbled Bismarck to arouse the southern states against

France, _and was instrumental in getting the southern states
to agree to a military alliance with Prussia.

2 Ludwig, op. cit., p. 342.
3

l)i
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Bismarck said
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that it was impossible to cede any German territory to a non
German nation.

It was now apparent that Napoleon's failure

to intervene along the Rhine, while Prussia had been pre
occupied in Bohemia during the Seven Weeks' War, cost France
the only opportunity she had to obtain compensation.
Bismarck knew very well how the Germans in the south
felt about Prussia.

Yet, unless they could be included in

the new GGrmany, the work of unification would be only half
complete.

Bismarck was determined, if possible, to bring the

states of southern German� into the Confederation.

In order

to have the southern German states seek a place in the
Confederation, Bismarck pursued two courses:

(1)

to make

the south Germans fear Prussia less and France more; and,
(2)

to badger France into making war on Germany, so that

the south German states would be forced, in self-defense,
to join the Confederation.

There is little doubt Bismarck

sought actively to have the German states in the south join
the Confederation; however, he wanted them to come in on their
own as an ally--not to be forced in by Prussian might.
After having rebuked French claims to the west bank of
the Rhine, Bismarck saw to it that the gist of this proposal
was made available to the French opposition newspapers.

The

sensation caused by the publication of the proposal and the
Prussian refusal was very damaging to the French government
and brought about the downfall of the foreign minister,
lJrouyn. 1+
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Following Bismarck's censure of France's plan for
obtaining Germanic lands as a form of compensation, new
negotiations were initiated.

The French envoy, Benedetti,

did not request German territory this time, but sought
Belgium instead.

Benedetti also encouraged Prussia to move

into southern Germany.

In principle, Bismarck did not object.

He felt that France should extend "as far as French is
spoken."

The Prussian minister did not see any reason for

assisting France in obtaining Belgium; especially since he
did not wish to move forcibly into southern Germany, and the
need for French protection against either Austria or Russia
was not sought by Prussia.

These negotiations concerning

possible French acquisition of Belgium did not amount to
anything; however, the draft of the treaty, written in
Benedetti's own handwriting, was used most damagingly by
Bismarck in 1870.

This draft, upon which no action was

taken when originally prepared, was published in 1870--one
5
week after France had declared war on Prussia.
Following Bismarck's refusal to allow France to annex
any Germdnic lands and his non-committal disposition
regarding Belgium, there was still no serious rift between
France and Prussia.

Actually, there was much basis for

agreement between the two countries.
impose peace on all of Europe.

Together, they could

In December 1866, Bismarck

wrote, "I have alwc1ys regarded this alliance as the natural

1·.yc l< , .l �£..:._ _£,j__!:.. :..
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expression of the lasting agreement of the interests of the
two countries.11

6

Napoleon felt the same and he supported the national
principle in Germany.

Napoleon desired to become the leader

in an alliance of free national states in western Europe.
The stumbling block in the French leader's path came from
the 'Bonapartist adventurers' who demanded a renaissance of
imperial prestige.

Bismarck diagnosed the French leader's

quandary as follows:
A King of Prussia can make mistakes, can
suffer misfortune and even humiliation, but the
old loyalty remains. The adventurer on the
throne LFrance7 possesses no such heritage of
confidence. He must always produce an effect.
His safety depends on his personal prestige, and
to enhance it sensations must follow each other
in rapid succession. Napoleon III has recently
lost more prestige than he can afford. To recover
it he will start a dispute with us on some pretext
or other. I do not believe that he personally
wishes war, indeed I think he wants to7avoid it,
but his insecurity will drive him on.
The Decline of Napoleonic Prestige During the 1860's
The decade of the 1860's had been turbulent and unfruit
ful for Napoleon.

The French emperoi was on the downward

curve of his destiny.
In 1863, during the Polish Insurrection, Napoleon had
sent notes of protest to the czar; however, he had not
actively intervened out of fear of possible Prussian support
of Russia.

During the Danish War, Napoleon III had remained

6
Taylor, l.oc. c1t.
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inactive.

This period of non-intervention in European

affairs was due to the fact the French were busy in Mexico
trying to establish a Mexican Empire under French rule.
Mexican Impire was to be headed by Archduke Maximilian of
Austria, a brother of Emperor Francis Joseph.

This

This farcical

adventure, sponsored by Napoleon, had ended in tragedy when,
after the conclusion of the American Civil War, the federal
government in Washington seemed ready to deal by force of
arms with this flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine.
Under pressure from United States authorities, France with
drew her troops, and the Austrian archduke was killed by
Mexican insurgents.

During the Seven Weeks' War of 1866, Napoleon again

abstained from active intervention--partly because he had
hoped for a prolonged conflict that would exhaust Prussia,
and partly because he had expected to be rewarded for his
neutrality.

Bismarck, after the defeat of Austria,

categorically refused to cede even one inch of German
territory; and, simultaneously, he used Napoleon's demands
for territorial compensations to arouse the southern German
states against France.

.

On the question of French acquisition

.
8
of Belgium, Bismarck had simply not commented.

Neither Bismarck nor Napoleon desired war and both now

sought some means to promote Napoleon in the eyes of the
French, and to demonstrate to the French people that Napoleon
was able to gain something tangible for the glorificaL·on
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of the French Empire.

The tangible entity that might serve

to satisfy the French appetite for honor and prestige came
to the fore--the Gr�rnd Duchy of Luxemburg.
Luxemburg--Possible Source for French Aggrandizement
The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was the last remaining
"personal union," enjoying this relationship with Holland.
Luxemburg was under the sovereignty of the King of Holland,
and Prussian troops garrisoned its capital as a federal
fortress under the old German Confederation, of which
Luxemburg had been a member.

The connection between the

grand duchy and Germany was strictly external--the population
did not consider themselves German.

The Prussian garrison in

Luxemburg had continued to occupy the fortress in spite of
the fact that the old German Confederation had been dissolved.
For the sake of calm in France and for the prolongation
of his dynasty, Napoleon realized that he must have some
immediate successes in foreign policy.

To this end he

desired to increase the territory of France along the
eastern border.

Very cautiously, the emperor prepared to

acquire the grand duchy.

Napoleon was willing to pay cash

for Luxemburg and the King of Holland was willing to sell
the grand duchy in order to pay his debts.

The question

concerning French acquisition of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg
was:

What would be Bismarck's "1tti.tude? 9
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The negotiations and talks that ensued during late 1866
and early 1867 appeared to be favorable for France.

Bismarck

wanted peace so as to concentrate on strengthening his position
and formulating the new federal constitution at home.

He

cared nothing for Luxemburg itself; it had little value as a
fortress, and its heavy industry was still underdeveloped.
Bismarck's anxiety, as usual, concerned the king.

King

William still lived in the atmosphere of the war of liberation
against France in 1813.

He would protest violently against

French acquisition of Luxemburg.
In all of his conversat, ions with Benedetti, Bismarck
expressed a favorable view to the French acquisition of
Luxemburg.

Benedetti was convinced that Bismarck would not

put the least obstacle in Napoleon's way.

Napoleon con

sidered Prussia's help in acquiring Luxemburg as a token of
her friendship--the idea of which he had not given up.
In spite of this seemingly favorable accord, the trans
action not only miscarried, but brought the two countries to
the verge of war.

Bismarck, favoring the cession of Luxem

burg to Napoleon, would not commit himself in writing.

He

was not prepared to invoke King William's anger, and wou\d
not allow his participation in the negotiations to appear in
written form.

Bismarck proposed taking William by surprise:

Napoleon and the King of Holland were to settle the entire
matter c1nd then present it to William as n fai.t accompli.
The� King of llo1.J.nnd and Napoleon both proc1',.L t · at d.
Thc 1 King of llo·11·lnd,

fc·)iJ ful
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sought definite Prussian approval of the negotiations.

The

French, possibly fearful of being tricked by Bismctrck, also
delayed.

However, Napoleon was never one to mature his

conspiracies in a hurry.

By the time the two soverei�s appeared ready to close

their transaction, the parliament of the North German

Thus, by the end of March 1867,

Confederation was in session.

Bismarck realized that in order to gain approval of his

constitution, he would have to maintain favor with the new
parliament.

When the Luxemburg issue became known to the

German people, a storm of protest arose.

Also, Russia and

England began to show interest in the matter.

Bismarck,

in refraining from giving his final approval, desired to see
which way the "wind was blowing" in Germany.

Soon, the spirit

of nationalism was prevalent throughout Germany and Bismarck
10
.
was swept up in the tide of nationalisti c pride.
After realizing the ground swell of German emotions
pouring forth over this issue, Bismarck now.made public for

the first time the secret treaties he had concluded with the
south German states.

Also, in the �eichstag, a discussion of

the Luxemburg issue brought forth a strong feeling of opposi

tion to the cession of "this old German lanct.n

11

Bismarck

used th�s opportunity to full advantage, when in a highly
theatrical speech in the Reichstag, he declared that German
power would defend German sLates and people�.
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The Dutch king now refused to consummate the sale and

relations between France and Prussia immediately worsened.
Bismarck not only refused to approve the transaction, but
now censured the French government for having bungled the
affair.
The Brink of War
Following the collapse of the talks regarding the
cession of Luxemburg, Napoleon felt deeply insulted.
his favorite ideas had terminated.

One of

Napoleon compared France

and Prussia as two good friends who had a quarrel in a coffee
house and were thereby compelled to fight a duel, although
they loved each other at heart.
on both sides of the Rhine.

National feeling ran high

War seemed a certainty.

minuteness of the quarrel notwithstanding.
and political leaders were eager for war.

The

Prussian military
Moltke wrote,

"Nothing could be more welcome to us than to have now the
12
war that we must have. ,r
Bismarck himself contemplated war.

He said,

It was not the possibility of defeat that con
cerned me, for Moltke had assured me we should
conquer. But it was a question whether we wish to
begin a war with France, even with the certainty or
extreme probability of victory. This question we
answered in the negative, and determined only to
make war under absolute compulsion. We considered
all the immense losses, all the grief and misery in
thousands of families. Yes, gentlemen, stare at me
if you will· do you think that I, too, have not a
heart� Belleve me, I have one that beats just like
your own. War will always be war--the misery of

l � 'I' ,ty l r,
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the devastated lands, the wails of widows and
orphans--it is all so terrible that I for one
would only grasp at this expedient under supreme
necessity.1>

Bismarck maintained that wars should be fought only for

essential interests, not for reasons of sentiment or prestige.
Luxemburg, r easoned the Prussian minister, Wds not an essen
tial interest for Germany.
and a pare nt with sons.

At heart, Bismarck was a civilian,

After his experiences during the

Austrian war, he seemed more determined than ever to resort
to war only when all other courses had failed.

While on the

battlefield at Sadowa, he said, "It makes me sick at heart to
think that Herbert L5:is oldest s9El may be lying like this
some day"; and later, "No one who has looked into the eyes of
a man dying on the battlefield will again go lightly into

war. n

14

War was averted when a conference of the great powers
was held in London in May 1867.

The London Conference reached

a compromise settlement wherein (1) Prussian troops would
evacuate the fortress and raze its fortifications; (2) France's
plan to acquire the grand duchy waq to be dropped; and (3) the
grand duchy was declared neutral under the joint guarantee
of the gr eat powers, but Luxemburg retained her membership
. 15
in the Zollverein.
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Following the Luxemburg settlement agreed upon at the
London Conference, France and Prussia both felt they had
received somewhat of a defeat.

Napoleon, in agreeing to the

compromise settlement, appeared to have won a diplomatic
victory over Prussia; how(�ver, he knew that this did not

meet the big increase in French power which the people had
expected.

Bism�rck, upon retiring Prussian troops from

Luxemburg, was aware of some los� of prestige.

Neither of

the two adversaries desired to fail again; therefore, the
Lond on Conference only slightly relieved the tension.

In

France, the French believed they had been tricked by
ttBismarckian diplomacy," and regarded every move forward
by Prussia as a move against France.16
Bismarck's New Weapon--Public Opinion
The Luxemburg affair is important for two reasons:

It

opened a new chapter in Bismarck's policy, and it was the
turning-point in relations between Prussia and France.

Initially, Bismarck evidently desired to help Napoleon acquire

the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; however, he soon found that his

policy would be impossible to carry out because of the intense
German national feeling opposing this arrangement.

Prior to

the Luxemburg crisis, Bismarck had engaged in cabinet policy
dictated by the needs of Prussian power politics--public
opinion was never taken into account.

Now it became apparent

to Bismarck that public opinion could no lon�er be i.gnor d.
lr1"l<ml(!y,

I
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In fact, he soon reached the conclusion that public opinion
and the national feeling of the German people were strong
weapons to be utilized by him.

Thenceforth, he spoke and

acted as the champion of the German national cause.

It might

be stated that Luxemburg was the turning point for Bismarck

.

from a Prussian to a German statesman.

17

Likewise, it was the turning point in Franco-Prussian
relations.

Napoleon was now experiencing what AustrL.1 had

gone through in 1866.
a dilemma:

He was not prepared for war and faced

By hasty preparations to draw upon himself the

reproach of bringing about a war, or to wait until he was
attacked and defeated.

From the experiences of Austria,

Napoleon concluded that he must reorganize his army as
quickly as possible so that it might be mobilized on the
shortest possible notice.

Thus began a period of la paix

armee (the armed peace) wherein the nations of Europe began
a military build-up with each n�tion trying to outdo the
other.
Last Grasp for Prestige
Napoleon's last attempt to secure some economic control
over Belgium consisted of French purchase of Belgian railway

lines in 186$-1869.

This action aroused national opposition

in Belgium and, also, Great Britain expressed concern over

this French move.
volved in this

Apparently, Bismarck did not become in

matter, .::ind it was r;ettled peDcc.:fu.Lly.

--�
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In France, Napoleon's regime was becoming more and more
unpopular.

With his prestige waning, it soon became apparent

that for the people to regain their feeling of loyalty to
the government, Napoleon surmised that the humiliation and
diplomatic defeat of Prussia was necessary.

All the while,

Napoleon was on the lookout for new allies he could count on
18
in the event of an armed conflict with Prussia.
During the summer of 1867--the year of the Paris
Exhibition--Bismarck visited Paris.
the old friendships of Biarritz.

Napoleon showed him all

The French press later

declared that Bismarck and Moltke had not actually visited
Paris to see the Exhibition, but had come instead to view
possible sites for the bombardment of Paris.
The Russian czar also visited Paris during the Exhibi
tion.

Alexander II had hopes of renewing the entente he had

enjoyed with France prior to the Polish Insurrection of 1863;
however, the czar and Napoleon failed to reach any amicable
agreement, and any pos3ibility of a Franco-Eussian alliance
seemed out of the question.
Napoleon looked to Austria and to Italy with the hope of
forming a triple alliance.

French troops protecting Rome as

the seat of the Papacy made any alliance with Italy out of

the que�tion.

The Italians desiring to get the French out of

Rome realized that Prussia was their best guarantee against
1
the French. 9
l8lt inhnrdt:,, Joe. cit.

191'1
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With Austri�-Hungary, Napoleon felt he had a much better

chance to secure an ally against Prussia.

Austria was not

ready to enter into any agreement wherein she would be drawn
into a war--the memory of Koniggratz remained.

The preten

tious triple alliance envisioned by Napoleon ended in nothing
more than talk.

Friendly letters were exchanged between

Napoleon and Francis Joseph in September 1869; however, no
pledge of support or desire for alliance came forth. 20
Thus, at the close of the 1860 1 s, France's prestige in

gener:.:tl and Napoleon's in particular was at a low ebb.

The

French had received setback upon setback in the field of
foreign affairs.

The population was growing more disenchanted

with the government.

The press was beginning to become more

hostile and urging the government to action.

The press

openly criticized the Prussians and hurled insults at them.
The official .Moniteur called the Prussian soldier a
"pitiable slave of a despotic government," and said of

· General Benedek (Austrian commander at Koniggratz) reg:':lrding
his defeat, "This proves him to have been even a worse
21
ignoramus than the Prussians, his adversaries.11

The mo o d

was one of tension and preparation--everyone knew that war
must come.

The question now was:

and who would start it?

20
21

,;yck, op. cit., p. J.61.
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CHAPTER V
THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR
"Bismarckian" Diplomacy in the Late l860's
From 1866 to 1870, a diplomatic web was craftily being
woven by that master weaver of diplomacy--Bismarck--with the
object of sheltering Prussia and entangling her enemies.
Bismarck's finesse, his unscrupulous methods, his daring bold
ness were most effectively used during those momentous years.
He knew just the arguments that would persuade his opponents,
and showed himself remarkably apt in subtly suggesting
favorable terms, yet never committing himself definitely to
any course.

Bismarck was one of the first statesmen to make

extensive use of the press for purposes of diplomatic
intrigue.

A number of journalists, both German and foreign,

were in his secret pay; a special fund, popularly known as
"the reptile fund," had been created for this purpose.
'Inspired' articles, sometimes written in Bismarck's own
office, would appear in prominent European newspapers

attackin.g certain men, suggesting certain plans, or threaten

ing certain acts.

In this way, he was able to hide his own

plans and, at the same time, cause his opponents to reveal
theirs.
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Bismarck's main objective to his diplomatic maneuvering
at this time was to bring about the complete unification of
Germany; however, he had doubts about whether or not the
final unification would take place during his lifetime.
He also believed that a unified Germany was only a question
of time, and the North German Confederation was only the
first step.

Bismarck foresaw an inevitable war with France;

however, he was determined that France would appear as the
aggressor--just as Austria had been made to appear the
aggressor in 1866.
The appearance of a new great power would, he realized,
upset the balance of power in Europe.

To sting France to

action at the right moment, and yet to make her appear as
the aggressor and the disturber of the peace of �urope was
Bismarck's aim.
Bismarck now began the process of isolating France so
that all nations would look on calmly while Prussia was
delivering the master stroke.
ally.

Italy was still Prussia's

The friendship of Russia could still be counted on.

Austria, if not overly friendly, was, at least, not hostile.
This had been assured by Bismarck's policy of mollification
after Koniggratz.

Also, Austria's fear of Russia in the east

would f9restall her intervention in the west.

England,

Bism1rck felt, would only intervene if Prussia violated the

neutrality of Belgiu m; therefore, the Prussian minister was
determined to respect Belgian neutritlity at '11 cost 0•

The

;.:, uthern German states, pre�rnmohly fr'. nd1y t ward:1 l•'r:1n •n,

h.d :ii/�n,;d
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efforts at diplomacy in trying to negotiate alliances with
Austria and Italy had proven fruitless.

While Bismarck was busy on the diplomatic front, the

Prussian military machine was being prepared for the
inevitable war with France.

The systematic preparation

instituted by Moltke was almost uncanny in its perfection.
Every possible difficulty was foreseen and prepared for.
France was carefully mapped, and soon the Prussian officers

knew the topography of the land better than the French them
In order to move troops to the front with the least

selves.

possible delay, strategic railways were constructed.

Equip

ment provided the Prussian forces was of the latest and best
pattern.

Nothing had been spared for the comfort and welfare

of the Prussian soldier--from the weapons he carried to the

handkerchiefs in his pockets, every detail was provided for.
Never before had preparations for war been so thorough

and so comprehensive.

All that was needed to put this great

military machine into motion was the command to commence
fighting.

Bismarck, it would seem, held all the trump cards,

and now he waited for a suitable excuse to have his war.

He realized that when war came with France, he would be able

to raise the nationalistic spirit in the south German states

to the point where they would join the new German unity move

ment.

Then, during the summer of 1870, the occasion for the

starting of a war with France arose--the Hohenzollern

. l
candi d uture for th0 throne o f S pa�n.
0
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Hohenzollern Candidature for the Throne of Spain
Since the overthrow of Queen Isabella II of Spain in

1866, the country had been without a monarch.

A monarchical,

but democratic con3titution had been formulated by the

National A3sembly of Spain, the Cortes, under the leade rship

of General Prim.

However, they were unable to find a Roman

Catholic prince who was willing to wear the Spanish crown.
Three different princes had refused the crown when it had
been proffered to them.
Certain Spaniards, encouraged by a diplomat named
Salazar, favored Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern--a cousin of
the Prussian ruler and brother of Prince Charles of
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the prince and later the king, of
Rumania.

The Sigmaringen branch of the Hohenzollern family

was Roman Catholic while the royal branch was protestant.
At first the proposals were not taken seriously, as
practically everyone, including King William, Prince Charles
Anton, Prince Leopold's father, and even the prince himself

were opposed to the plan.

Against all of these stood Bismarck.

Bismarck could see a definite advantage in having a friendly
Hohenzollern occupy the throne of the country in France's
rear.

He also realized that it would be necessary for France

to plac� troops along her common border with Spain in the
event of a Franco-Prussian war if the throne of Spain was
occupied by a Hohen�ollern.
With all of his influtnce and pre �ure that h� could
mu. t.cr, Flismarck ,.rncoucJ.;r;ed •)ITeryone c nn .ctt,d with I.he)
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affair to support Prince Leopold, and to encourage the prince
to accept the offer.

Bismarck knew full well that France

would be violently opposed to this idea and, in his thinking,
he must surely have been prepared to engage in a war against
France to carry out his aims.~

During the months of late 1869 and early 1870, many
secret negotiations between Lhe Spanish, the Hohenzollern
family, and the Prussian court took place.

Bismarck, without

his king's approval, encouraged and financially supported the
candidature of Prince Leopold.

Negotiations were greatly

involved and led to the almost constant exchange of emissaries
between Germany and Spain--this too was unknown to King
William.

For about a year, the proposal was formally rejected

by all concerned--except Bismarck.

Finally, in June 1870,

Prince Leopold accepted the Spanish offer and the Prussian
4
king gave his consent "with a heavy, very heavy heart."
Throughout aJ.l this time, the negotiations were still
secret.

The scheme was to have the Spanish Cortes, the

governing body that elected the king, suddenly aware of the

candidature and then to have the election carrieu through so
quickly that the rest of Europe would not learn of the plan
until after its consummation.

Also, this plan called for the

announc�ment of the election of Prince Leopold as king to
emanate from the Spanish parliament.
2
Eyck, op. cit., pp. 165 ff.
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The entire story surrounding the Hohenzollern candida
ture is extremely complicated.

The 'underground' activities

carried on by Bismarck and his agents in attempting to secure
the throne of Spain for a Hohenzollern prince have never been
completely chronicled; and Bismarck even denied some of the
activities attributed to him.

However, there is little doubt

the Prussian minister used every strategem to secure the
Spanish throne for a Hohenzollern.

Bism�rck used every

tactic available to secure the offer of the crown from Spain
and then to obtain the acceptance by a German prince.
Bismarck had to bring pressure to bear on King William and
on Prince Charles, as well as on the candidate, Prince Leopold.
Bismarck resorted to the use of secret agents and sent them
well-equipped with bribes to Spain.

In the event of a war,

Bismarck noted thdt a Hohenzollern on the throne of Spain

·
5
m1g
. ht be wort h two army corps to prussia.

The Scheme That Failed
After Prince Leopold and King William had both relented,
a fantastic accident occured which changed the course of
history.

In Berlin, the Spanish representative, Salazar,

sent a telegram to Madrid informing General Prim that he
would return to Madrid within a week with Prince Leopold's
accepta�ce in his pocket.

At this time, the Spanish Cortes

was in session and Leopold could be elected king before
anyone knew what was happening.
'.)

Ji' l r} n l. oy , _)J\!._. c j -�-, p. 2 1?.

Then fate intervened,
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A clerk at the Prussian legation in Madrid blundered; he
p assed on the message that SJlazar would return from Berlin
in the middle of July.

Prim dar ed not kee p the Cortes

hanging about, and, on June 23, he prorogued it until autumn.
Upon hi s return to Madrid on June 26, Salazar found the

Cor tes adjourned.

General Prim agreed to re-convene the

Cortes; however, he had to reveal why it

Wi.:l.S

being called

The news that Leopold was to be elected
6
King of Spain reached Paris on 3 July.
back into session.

French React ion
Napoleon was deeply hurt by this attem pt of the House of
Hohenzollern to establish and extend their in fluence to his
rear.

Napoleon foresaw the dangers of encirclement and the

possibility of a future war on two f ronts.

The French ruler

also realized that if he did not act in this matter, his
authority, which had suffered several diplomatic defeats
since Konigg ratz, would suffer an irreparable blow--possibly

.
7
en d.1ng h.1s reign.

The French foreign minister, the Due de Gramont, saw an

opportunity to restore prestige to the Napoleonic dynasty and
to show that he was a more capable foreign minister than his
predecessors had been.

Gramont wanted more than to merely

keep Leopold off the Spanish throne; he desired to humiliate
Prussia and to restore France's inf luence in Europe.8
6 Tay
lor, op. cit., p. 119.
71· y I
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Gramont dispatched the French ambassador, Benedetti,

to the health resort at Ems, where King William was vacation
ing.

Benedetti was to take this urgent matter up with the

king personally.

In the French parliament, Gramont had made

a speech that was quite offensive to Prussia when he said,
We do not believe that respect for the rights
of a neighbouring [sicl people obliges us to allow
a foreign Power to set one of her Princes on the
throne of Charles V. This will not happen; of that
we are quite sure. But, should it be otherwise we
should know how to do our duty without hesitation
and without weakness. 9

Therefore, instead of approaching Spain on the matter of a

Hohenzollern occupying the Spanish throne, France turned
on Prussia.

King William was thoroughly alarmed by the wave

of protest coming from France.

During the entire crisis, the

Prussian ruler acted with courtesy and moderation.

He was

attempting to maintain peace and was not really desirous of

becoming involved in the affair.

Upon hearing the vehement protests of the French, King

William reverted to his former position and advised Prince

Leopold and Leopold's father to renounce his acceptance of

the Spanish throne.

Prince Leopold's father, Prince Charles

Anton, made the announcement of Leopold's withdrawal on 12
10
July.
the negotiations between King William and
During
.

Benedet ti, Bismarck had been at his estate of Varzin in the
Pomeranian forests.

Instead of rushing to hi0 kinv,'s side

9oarmstaedter, o • cit., p. 35h.
l(.J1)i l 1-, o �._c_iJ .•.. , p. J/1.L
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during this critical period, Bismarck remained in seclusion
at Varzin until 12 July.

He left to go to the king at Ems;

however, upon arriving in Berlin, he heard of Prince Leopold's
withdrawal, and interrupted his journey to

'
DffiS.

Bismarck had

chosen to remain dt Varzin for such a long time in order to
shift the respon□ibility of any failure onto King William.

Had the French stopped at this juncture of negotiations,
the matter would have been settled peaceably and the French
would have been looked upon as the victors.
made two fatal mistakes.

Napoleon now

He allowed himself to be influenced

by the irresponsible Paris press and right-wing extremists.
These groups claimed the resignation of Prince Leopold had
been treated as a private affair involving the Hohenzollern
princes, and, from outward appearances, Prussia was not
involved in the matter.

Napoleon's second mistake was his

relapse into the methods of personal government by giving
Gramont an order behind the backs of the other ministers.
Gramont forwarded this order to the French ambassador
in Prussia, Benedetti, who then forwarded it to King William.
Napoleon demanded that William openly endorse Prince Leopold's
withdrawal; that the Prussian ruler apologize for having
supported the candidature; and that he promise never again in

the future to consent to a revival of HohenzolJ.ern claims to
11
. h throne.
t h e S panis
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The Infamous "Ems Dispatch"
When Benedetti presented this new demand to King William
at Ems, William was surprised at the impertinence of Napoleon.
Nevertheless, William received Benedetti courteously, but
refused Napoleon's demand--other than repeating the announce�
ment of Leopold's withdrawal.

King William forwarded a

dispatch to Bismarck in Berlin describing his meeting with
Benedetti.
Bismarck was at dinner with Von Moltke and Von Roon
when the king's message from Ems arrived.

Upon receipt of

the king's dispatch, Bismarck proceeded to 'edit' the message
in order to enrage the French.

Bismarck changed the wording

so that it would appear that a heated discussion between the
king and Benedetti had taken place.

Also, during this

discussion, the king had refused the French demand sharply,
and had dismissed the French ambassador without ceremony.
As Bismarck later stated,
• • • I reduced the telegram by striking out
words, but without adding or altering, to the
following form:
"After the news of the renunciation of the
hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern had been
officially communicated to the imperial govern
ment of France by the royal government of Spain,
the French ambassador at Ems further demanded of
his Majesty the King that he would authorize him
to telegraph to Paris that his Majesty the King
bound himself for all future time never again to
give his consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew
their candidature. His Majesty the King there
upon decided not to receive the French ambas.ador
again and sent to tell him throurh the aide-de
camp on duty that his Mnje:ty h;d nothing furth�r
to communicdt, Lo the ambas:rndor."

75
The difference in the effect of the abbre
viated text of the Ems telegrum as compared with
that produced by the original was not the result
of 3tronger words but of the form, which made this
announcement appear decisive, while Lfhe originaI7
version would have only been regarded as a
fragment of a negotiati�� still pending, and to
be continued at Berlin.

Thus, in the revised "i�ms Dispatch" (which should really

be called the "Berlin Dispatch"), it appeared the King of

Prussia had been insulted from the Prussian point-of-view;

while the French felt their ambassador had been slighted.

This revised communication had exactly the effect expected

and intended by Bismarck.

When King William read of this

dispatch in the papers, he exclaimed, TIThat means war! n
The king recognized that his authority to declare war,

vested in him by the constitution, had been usurped by his
chancellor.

For William, only the formality of declaring

. d. 13
the war remaine

In Paris, French public opinion was aroused by this

apparent insult to the French ambassador.

Emotion ran high

throughout France--events could not be held back.

The French

prime minister, Emile Ollivier, declared in the Chamber of
Deputies that France would enter the armed conflict with

Prussia ''with a 1 ight heart."

Four days after Ollivier's

statement, on July 19, 1870, Napoleon declared war on
Prussia:

14

12
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Results of the French Declaration
Bismarck had won again his old game of playing the
injured party.

France, like Au3tria in 1866, had made the

first openly hostile move.
defender, not the aggressor.

Thu.s, Prussia appeared as the
Bismarck now published the

draft in Benedetti's own handwriting of the proposed alliance
between France and Prussia.

This treaty of alliance provided

that France might secure some Rhenish or adjacent territory.
The fact thi:l.t this alliance had been proposed by Benedetti
following the Seven Weeks' War of 1866 was not publicized;
in fact, Bismarck made it appear as though this proposal was
of recent origin.

This proposal had an immediate effect upon

both German and foreign opinion.
Thus, the impolite and tactless procedure of the French
government had achieved within a couple of days what Bismarck
had estimated would take a generation--the unificati on of
Germany.

Patriotism and nationalism filled the hearts of all

Germans.

Except for two members, the Diet of the North German

Federation voted the war budget unanimously.
Not the least surprising feature of the preparations for
war was the complete forgetfulness of all local differences.
The southern German stcttes, after a brief attempt by Bavaria

to take.a stand of armed neutrality, and with decided

reluctance on the part of the King of 1/lurttemberg, fell into

line.

Napoleon tried to present hims�lf as the friend of the

south German �,ta Les and the liht)rator of thn recent 1.y
lnnd •
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Frankfurt!" wrote the Paris Journal Officiel, "it is not
enough that you should be the victims of Bismarck's ambition·'

the Prussian minister desires that you should become his
accomplice--you are worthy to fight in a be i,ter cause."

Hostilities had been declared against Prussia alone, ignoring
the newly formed North German Confederation.

"By his mere

declaration of war," wrote an observant London Times corres
pondent, "Napoleon has done more toward unifying Germany than
in the ordinary course of things could have been accomplished
in a generation or two.11

15

Outbreak of Hostilities
The nominal commander-in-chief of the German armies was
the King of Prussia, but all military movements and operations
were directed by the strategic genius of Helmuth von Moltke.
Von Moltke had divided his forces into three large sections:
a central army under the command of Prince Frederick Charles;
a northern right wing under General Von Steinmetz; and a
southern left wing, consisting of south German contingents,
under the Crown Prince of Prussia.

The precise planning that

had been effected months before now paid handsome dividends
for the Germans.

The message:

"The army is to be mobilized

according to plan!" was sent throughout Germany on July 16,
So perfect had been the planning that the soldiers

1870.

were ready for action upon leaving the barracks. 16

15 Henders n,
o
o • cit., p. 4.211.•
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Insofar as the Prussians were efficient, competent,
well-ordered, systematic, and proficient, the French reached
the opposite extreme.

1be French soldiers were without the

bare necessities of existence, the central directing command
was without vigor and lacked forethought, the commanders
complained of insufficient foodstuffs, insufficient stores
and rations, lack of maps of the French frontier, and one
French commander sent the following message; n • • • not found
my brigade, not found my division general.
Don't know the whereabouts of my regiments! 11

What shall I do?

17

According to the German plan of battle, rapid success
was necessary in order to prevent the intervention of Austria
and Italy and also to forestall any attempted pressure from
the other great powers.

The initial successes of the German

troops were preludes to the siege of Metz and the fall of
Sedan.
After having lost the skirmishes in the villages on the
outskirts of Metz, the French commander, Bazaine, was forced
to withdraw to the fortress of Metz and make preparations for
withstandin� a siege.

The Germans had cut off Bazaine's

potential �venues of escape and now began the process of
conquest by starvation.

Earlier Napoleon had left Bazaine's

army and had taken refuge with Marshal Patrice tv':acMahon' s
army at Chalons.

Upon leaving Bazaine at Metz, Napoleon

realized he could not return to Paris becau e Bazaine was the
people's hero; and any move by Napoleon which app�ared to b

17
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leaving Bazaine to his fate would arouse an already hostile
public to an ugly pitch.

Napoleon decided therefore to

commit MacMahon's army to the task of rescuing Bazaine's
forces or to be destroyed in the attempt.

This was a

political as well as a military maneuver.

The Council of

Ministers stressed the importance of rescuing Bazaine in order
to prevent a possible revolution by the people of France.
Suffice it to say that MacMahon's forces were repelled
in their attempt to reach Bazaine at Metz and were forced
to withdraw to the fortress of Sedan.
an untenable situation.

Soon MacMahon was in

German troops had cut off his possible

eastern escape route, and German troops held all roads to the
west.

Two choices were left to MacMahon:

he could move his

forces across the Belgian border, and moving through that coun
try's territory, to outflank the encircling forces; or, he
could try to break through the German forces with a frontal
assault.
Bismarck, who had been at royal headquarters since the
beginning of the war, held a conference with King William.
At this meeting, it was agreed that stern measures were needed
to prevent the French from crossing the Belgian border.
In blunt, undiplomatic terms, Bismarck warned the Belgian
governm�nt that should the French army cross over the Belgian
frontier bearing arms, the Germans reserved the right to

pursue them, and, if necessary, to defeat the enemy on Belgian
soil.
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The ensuing battle at Sedan resulted in the slaughter
and capitulation of MacMahon's forces.

The French emperor,

Louis Napoleon III, was also captured.

The surrender was

consummated on September 2, 1870.
the Second Empire fell.

With the capture of Napoleon

Bismarck met Napoleon in a peasant's

cottage and treated him with extreme courtesy.

Napoleon,

18
since he was now a prisoner, refused to speak for France.
A provisional government was established in Paris on
September 4, 1870, and Jules Favre, the new foreign minister,
announced that no surrender would be forthcoming.
between Favre and Bismarck proved fruitless.

A meeting

Bismarck had to

make demands for Metz and Strasbourg, whether he desired them
or not; and Favre could not surrender them.

France was now

fighting for national integrity, not for imperial prestige
or for influence across the Rhine; Germany was fighting a war
of aggression and conquest.
After the fall of Sedan, the war dragged on for several
more months.

In October, Bazaine capitulated at JJ:etz.

Germans moved against Paris and encircled the city.

The

The

besieged Parisians suffered hunger, thirst, and disease, but
still would not give up.

Even furious bombardment by heavy

guns could not break their spirit.

Nothing could stem the

German tide and finally, in February 1871, the French admitted
defeat.
Following the defeat of France, Bismctrck and King William
imposed a harsh peace on the ¥rench.

18w
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the peace treaty terminating the Franco-Prussian War, the
French were forced to pay a five billion franc indemnity;
to cede all of Alsace and the northern part of Lorraine to
Germany; and most humiliating of all--to witness the triumphal
19
entry of the German army into Paris.
The German Empire
Prior to the capitulation of the French in February of
1871, an event occured on the outskirts of Paris that was
to mark a drastic change in the course of world history and
eventually lead to two World Wars in the twentieth century.
In January 1871, at the luxurious Palace of Versailles, the
German Empire was born.
On January 18, 1871, King William I of Prussia was
crowned Kaiser of all Germany.

From the initial victories

gained by the German troops in this war, the tide of national
ism rose ever higher.

The people of Germany clamored for

unity and demanded a new Germany that would truly be the
"Fatherland. 11

In the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles, the

King of Prussia made an imposing figure in his field marshal's
uniform.

He wore rows of medals on his tunic and, despite

his age, maintained a military bearing.

As the ornate crown

was placed on his head, swords flashed high in salute and a
great cheer made the crystal chandelier shiver and tinkle.
In the courtyurd outside the palace, mounted lancer
19

Ll_id.,

p.

I il/ 1

•

par•ded

82
followed by batt alions of troops from every German state.
French citizens gather ed at the gate and were awed by the
strutt ing Germans.
The American Civil War general Ambrose E. Burnside, who
was present as an official United Sta tes obs erver, commented,
"I shall neve r forget the pomp and pageantry.

have I witnessed its equal.

Never before

The splendid German army

is to be respected, admired and feared."
But of all onlookers at the coronation, no man was more
enthralled than Prince Otto von Bismarck.

The 'Iron

Chancellor's' eyes misted as he watched the fulfillment of
his life's ambitions.

Even though the war was not yet won,

and the Fr ench resistance in some areas was still fierce and
unbroken, Bismarck did not flinch from the prosecution of
his policies and he would bring ev en great er glory for his
beloved 'Fatherland.'
Bismarck knew the gigantic ta sks that lay ahead and he
would not spare himself until the words of the new national
anthem--"Deutschland, Deutschland uber alles" (Germany,
20
Germany over all)--came to pass.

20
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Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck, not yet fifty-six
years of age and within ten years of having been appointed
chief minister to the King of Prussia, had made Germany into
a united entity under Prussian leadership.

His dream, which

he, himself, had doubts of becoming a reality within his
lifetime, had been fulfilled.

To be sure, the first decade

of his tenure were years of turmoil and strife and suffering.
Nevertheless, Bismarck had prosecuted his policy without
faltering.
During the first ten years he had served as minister,
Bismarck had led Prussia into three wars; he had been over
bearing and demanding in the prosecution of his foreign
policy; he had had to battle parliament, the military, and
had even been compelled to bring anguish upon his beloved
monarch.

Bismarck was not a militarist, and he fought

continually for the right of "diplomatic power n to take
precedence over "military power."

Bismarck's attempts to

establish the principle of civilian responsibility for the
direction of the war effort were bitterly opposed.

There is

no doubt Bismarck saw the need for a strong military force to
attain his ends; however, to him, the use of military force
was a m asure of last resort--to bo u cd
f 1i.Lud.

nly when all ,1

Bismarck was a civilian to the core, and he always
wanted to back a certain winner.

Von Moltke, the great

Prussian general, had told Bismarck many times that nothing
was certain in war.

Therefore, the Prussian minister would

try all possible diplomatic moves to attain his goal prior
to using military force.

Once he had decided the use of the

military was necessary, he still reserved the right to decide
when to ca.11 a halt to hostilities or, to tell the military
leaders how to engage the enemy in certain battles.

Due to

Bismarck's interference in military matters, he was soon
scorned by most military men; and, during the Franco
Prussian War, attempts were made to exclude him from any real
contact with the operational aspects of the war.

In defense

of Bismarck's attitude on the prosecution and continuation of
hostilities, it must be remembered that he, alone, was aware
of the overall situation concerning the war.

Bismarck had to

keep in his mind, not only the immediate circumstances
concerning a particular engagement or the attitude of the
enemy civilian population, but, most important, he had to
continually concern himself with the attitude of the neutral
countries.

The one thing Bismarck feared most during his

life-time was a general war throughout central Europe.
Most st�tesmen do not plan wars, but drift into them and

then plead that this was unintentional.
Bismarck aspired to control events.

On the other hand,

The Prussian minister

would resort to war only ''when all otht\r moans w 'r
,xh

1L�t

d," nnd th n only for "a pri.zu w rthy ( f tl1t:
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1
sacrifices which every war demands."

The planned wars of

Bismarck killed thousands--the so-called 'just' wars of the
twentieth century have killed millions.

To Bismarck, war was

a clumsy way of settling international disputes.

War

deprived him of control and left the decisions to the
generals--whose ability he distrusted.

Bismarck saw war as

an indispensable method to "reach certain goals"; he never
regarded it as either "fine or desirable in itself.11

2

In order to successfully attain his goals in the realm
of foreign policy, Bismarck always advocated two doctrines:
First, he sought to isolate his enemy; and, second, once the
enemy had been engaged on the battlefield, Bismarck wanted
the adversary defeated as quickly as possible.
The three wars fought by Prussia during Bismarck's first
decade in office reflect the above doctrines.

The Prussian

minister was very careful to insure himself that his foe
would be without allies.

In some instances, he was aware of

particular situations in various countries that prevented
their intervention; at other times, it became necessary for
him to gain pledges of neutrality from potential opponents.
If a particular country threatened him while he was still in
the process of carrying-out his war effort, he might put this
country _down wit h a counter-threat--as he did to Russia when

she tried to intervene during the Austro-Prussian War.

Still

another method employed by Bismarck to insure non-intervention
1
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was his complete awareness of the political temperament that
existed in the other nations of Europe.

He had an uncanny

awareness and insight regarding the politicians of his day.
Concerning his doctrine of rapid victory, he always was
ready to negotiate when the time was right.

Whenever he

felt his aims had been achieved, he was ready and willing to
seek a peLlceful settlement.

At times, he was at odds with

the military and the king concerning the desirability of
Also, the terms of the

initiating peace negotiations.

peace often left much to be desired insofar as the military
and the king were concerned.

Nevertheless , Bismarck managed

to have his way and, in so doing, managed to prevent the one
thing he feared most:

a general war involving a coalition of

nations against central Europe.
In carrying-out his foreign policy, Bismarck had only
one aim:

The increase of Prussia's power and the establish

ment of Prussian hegemony in Europe.

Bismarck remained

flexible in his foreign policy; he forestalled any possible
coalition of neighboring powers, while, at the same time,
keeping open the opportunity of establishing any alliances he
felt beneficial.

Following the initial decade of war, a long

period of peace dedicated to the consolidation of Prussia's
gains e�sued.

Throughout these years of turmoil, Bismarck

showed himself to be a statesman who knew how to be daring
as well as judicious.
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